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That the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ fluctuated following the Second World War 
is widely recognized. At the end of December 1962, former US Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson went so far as to pronounce the last rites on the special relationship, declaring: 
‘[Britain’s] attempt to play a separate power role – that is, a role apart from Europe, a role 
based on the “special relationship” with the US ... – this role is about played out’.1 
Nevertheless, ‘the special relationship’ has acquired something of a Lazarus quality.2 Even in 
the aftermath of Britain’s unwelcome - from the American perspective - announcement in 
1968 of its intention to withdraw from East of Suez, the US State Department felt able to 
observe: ‘The special relationship has been pronounced dead as often as Martin Bormann has 
been reported alive.... Indeed, perhaps the best evidence that it is still alive is the fact that its 
detractors feel obliged to re-announce its death every few months.’3 Edward Heath’s studied 
coolness to Washington notwithstanding, successive British Prime Ministers (and US 
Presidents) have had little compunction in ostentatiously adhering to the concept of the 
special relationship. During Prime Minister David Cameron’s first visit to the White House in 
July 2010, for instance, President Barrack Obama himself proclaimed that the ‘special 
relationship will only grow in the years to come’.4 Referring to Anglo-American relations, he 
and David Cameron subsequently wrote that ‘Ours is not just a special relationship, it is an 
essential relationship – for us and for the world.’5 
The rhetoric of the special relationship, however, has often obscured underlying 
differences in policy, priorities, and interests which have blemished Anglo-American 
relations from the time of the Second World War onwards. In his celebrated work Allies of a 
Kind on the war against Japan, Christopher Thorne observes that ‘however close they might 
be to one another, Britain and the United States inevitably remained separate, sovereign states 
... whose interests, contrary to Churchill’s assertion, could and did differ and conflict as well 
as coincide’.6 In a similar vein, Wm. Roger Louis has remarked that ‘The wartime archives 
amply reveal that the sense of historic antagonism between Britain and the United States 
continued to exist along with the spirit of co-operation generated by the war.’7 David 
Reynolds, moreover, has characterized the war-time Anglo-American alliance as a 
‘temporary marriage of convenience, with competition the persistent counterpoint to the 
melody of co-operation’.8 Reynolds has also emphasised that the relationship between Britain 
and America ‘though peaceful and often very close, particularly at the height of the Second 
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World War, was also one of persistent rivalry’.9 This was especially so with regard to the 
Middle East.10 
As early as 1942, the British War Cabinet ‘realised that there were dangers in 
bringing the Americans in too prominently into the Middle East. They might divest us 
completely of responsibility and attempt to oust us from our interests, particularly as far as oil 
was concerned.’11 Moreover, Britain’s Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, Sir Ronald 
Campbell, warned that ‘in the Middle East it looks as though they wish to get as many cards 
in their hands as they can, or at least more than they have now’.12 Suspicion was not 
restricted to the British. In February 1943, US Interior Secretary, Harold Ickes, warned 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the British were ‘trying to edge their way’ into Saudi oil, 
concluding: ‘the British never overlooked an opportunity to get in where there was oil’.13 
Conversely, Winston Churchill, in an acerbic exchange with Roosevelt towards the beginning 
of 1944, admitted that ‘There is apprehension in some quarters here that the United States has 
a desire to deprive us of our oil assets in the Middle East on which, among other things, the 
whole supply of our Navy depends’.14 ‘I am disturbed’, rejoined Roosevelt, ‘about the rumor 
that the British wish to horn in on Saudi Arabian oil reserves.’15 Roosevelt’s subsequent 
assurance ‘we are not making sheep’s eyes at your oil fields in Iran and Iraq’,16 did not satisfy 
the British, the Ministerial Oil Committee cautioning in April 1944: ‘it is not improbable that 
some sections of American opinion may seek an opportunity to improve their position at our 
expense.’17 Highlighting Britain’s resolve to preserve its oil interests in the region, newspaper 
tycoon and British Cabinet member, Lord Beaverbrook, stressed: ‘Oil is the single greatest 
post-war asset remaining to us. We should refuse to divide our last asset with the 
Americans.’18 During Anglo-American petroleum talks in 1944-5, the British negotiators, led 
by Beaverbrook, incensed the American side by seeking to discriminate against ‘dollar’ oil in 
order to protect Britain’s balance of payments position and ultimately the value of the pound 
sterling.19 Despite British efforts to protect its assets in the Middle East, even at the expense 
of Anglo-American harmony and co-operation in the region, Britain still sought to ‘harness’ 
American power to ‘serve its own ends’.20 This, nonetheless, was a challenging endeavour for 
a declining power with respect to a rising one. Far from turning American power to its own 
advantage, Britain often found its post-war policies frustrated by a lack of American support, 
not least with respect to Palestine. 
 In response to President Truman’s support for the idea of issuing 100 000 certificates 
to displaced Jews to travel to Palestine, which appeared to inflate Britain’s problems in this 
troubled territory, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee complained: ‘My annoyance is with 
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the Americans who forever lay heavy burdens on us without lifting a little finger to help.’21 
Attlee was also chagrined by Truman’s refusal to delay issuing his Yom Kippur statement at 
the beginning of October 1946 in which he called not merely for ‘substantial immigration 
into Palestine’, but also the establishment of a ‘viable Jewish state’.22 ‘I received with great 
regret’, Attlee informed Truman, ‘your letter refusing even a few hours’ grace to the Prime 
Minister of a country which has the actual responsibility for the government of Palestine in 
order that he might acquaint you with the situation and the probable results of your action.’23 
Referring to the widely held British view that post-war American policy towards Palestine 
was being unduly influenced by the domestic political considerations of the Truman White 
House, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin waspishly stated: ‘in international affairs, I cannot 
settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections’.24 British despair at US 
failure to provide unambiguous support for its policies and position in the Middle East can 
also be identified with respect to Egypt. 
In the years following the Second World War, Anglo-Egyptian relations had become 
increasingly fraught over failure to reach a negotiated settlement for the withdrawal of British 
troops from the Suez Canal Zone base. In the wake of a visit to Washington in January 1952, 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was reported by his Cabinet colleague, Harold Macmillan, 
to have been ‘forcibly struck – indeed horrified – at the way [the British] are treated by the 
Americans today. They are polite; listen to what we have to say, but make (on most issues) 
their own decisions’.25 Referring to the negotiations over the Suez base towards the end of 
1953, Eden minuted indignantly: ‘The American position over Egypt becomes increasingly 
unhelpful. The Americans will have no friends left if they go on this way.’26 Several months 
earlier, the United States Information Agency had conceded that ‘At present, we cannot 
support completely either the British or the Egyptian position. We wish to avoid the 
appearance of endorsing the positions taken by either side.’27 
From the British perspective the US failure not only to stand by Britain, but also to 
exert pressure on the Egyptians over the Suez base negotiations, made the achievement of an 
agreement acceptable to Britain more difficult. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had 
explicitly told Churchill that he wished to avoid the ‘appearance of ganging up on the 
Egyptians’.28 Such an approach was anathema to the British, the former Oriental Minister at 
the British Embassy in Cairo, Sir Walter Smart, maintaining that ‘If one day Egyptians, 
Arabs, Persians, realised that they cannot down us by playing the American card, the whole 
situation in the Middle East will become easier. That can only happen if the Americans come 
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to realise that we sink or swim together in the Middle East.’29 In July 1953, the acting 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, complained that ‘so long as the Egyptians think they can 
play the Americans off against us, the chances of our reaching agreement are negligible’.30 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir William Strang, was of a similar mind 
emphasizing: ‘I am sure that until our friends form up solidly behind us the Egyptians will try 
to evade in turn every commitment to the West which we seek from them.’31 The Minister at 
the British Embassy in Cairo, Michael Creswell, had already expressed his fear of the 
‘damaging effect of so flagrant a lack of Anglo-American solidarity’.32 This lack, from the 
British perspective, of solidarity reached something of a climax during the 1956 Suez crisis. 
The nationalization of the British and French-owned Suez Canal Company by Egypt’s 
President Nasser in July 1956 had been considered by Anthony Eden, who by now had 
replaced Churchill as Prime Minister, to be not merely an affront to British prestige, but also 
an attack on vital national interests. Eden’s failure to enlist unequivocal US backing for 
diplomatic and ultimately military efforts to not merely reverse nationalization, but also 
unseat the recalcitrant Nasser, was a source of intense frustration to the embattled Prime 
Minister. Eden’s exasperation was heightened by his fraught relationship with US Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles. Indeed, Eden’s highly strung personality clashed with Dulles’ 
lack of sensitivity which once prompted Churchill to remark: ‘Foster Dulles is the only case I 
know of a bull who carries his china shop with him’.33 To reflect the Secretary of State’s 
dower nature, Churchill is also said to have coined the phrase: ‘Dull, Duller, Dulles’,34 while 
Eden described him as the ‘woolliest type of pontificating American’.35 
Shortly before the announcement on 3 August 1956 by Britain, France, and America 
of an international maritime conference to be held in London, Dulles told Eden that ‘A way 
had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he is attempting to swallow’, the British Prime 
Minister claiming these words ‘rang in my ears for months’.36 On the eve of a second 
international conference in London in September designed to give definition to Dulles’ idea 
of placing the waterway under international supervision through the creation of the Suez 
Canal Users’ Association, normally abbreviated to SCUA, the US Secretary of State appeared 
to undermine his own scheme by proclaiming that if Egypt blocked passage of American 
vessels sailing under the SCUA regime, ‘We do not intend to shoot our way through. It may 
be that we have a right to do it, but we don’t intend to do it as far as the US is concerned.’37 
Eden subsequently stressed that ‘it would be hard to imagine a statement more likely to cause 
the maximum allied disunity and disarray’.38 In a similar vein, Eden’s press secretary, 
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William Clark, complained: ‘Dulles pulled the rug from under us and watered down the 
Canal Association till it was meaningless.’39 
‘The nub of the thing,’ recalled US Ambassador in London, Winthrop Aldrich, ‘was 
that Eden thought this organization [SCUA] was being formed for the purpose of laying a 
basis for intervention by force’.40 Dulles’ intervention scotched any realistic chance of this 
and certainly Eden considered his acceptance of SCUA to be the ‘greatest mistake of his 
career’.41 To make matters worse, Dulles, during a press conference on 2 October 1956, 
remarked with reference to SCUA: ‘There is talk about teeth being pulled out of the plan, but 
I know of no teeth; there were no teeth in it’, adding that the US ‘could not be expected to 
identify itself 100 per cent either with the colonial Powers or the Powers uniquely concerned 
with the problem of getting independence as rapidly, and as fully, as possible.’42 Eden’s 
reaction exemplified the exasperation felt at the Secretary of State’s apparent diplomatic 
chicanery and verbal dissimulation. Foreign Office Minister Anthony Nutting recalled that on 
reading Dulles’ statement, the Prime Minister ‘flung the piece of paper across the table, 
hissing as he did so “And now what have you to say for your American friends?”’43 Eden 
also informed his Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, that ‘We have been misled so often by 
Dulles’ ideas that we cannot afford to risk another misunderstanding .... Time is not on our 
side in this matter.’44 The day after Dulles’ statement, Eden speculated that Nasser might be 
planning to subvert the governments of Saudi Arabia and Libya, adding that ‘everything U.S. 
say makes that more likely’.45 The years did not sooth the rancour and in retirement Eden 
described Dulles as ‘tortuous as a wounded snake, with much less excuse’.46 Eden also 
condemned Dwight D. Eisenhower’s opposition to the use of force in Egypt, characterizing 
the US President as ‘the Neville Chamberlain of the fifties’.47 
Lack of US support for British polices and position in the Middle East can also be 
detected with reference to Iran. In May 1951, the Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammed 
Mossadeq, had nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which at the time 
was Britain’s largest single overseas asset and perceived as vital to Britain’s economic well-
being.48 Although American oil companies participated in a British-sponsored boycott of 
Iranian oil, at a governmental level the British were much less impressed with the response of 
the United States to the nationalization crisis, Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison informing 
the US Ambassador in London that ‘he could not understand [the] US attitude. He expected 
100 percent cooperation and was only getting 20 percent’.49 While Britain and America 
eventually co-operated in unseating Mossadeq in August 1953, it was a CIA-led operation 
with MI6 playing a subordinate role.50 As the price of continuing to have a stake in Iran, 
6 
 
moreover, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s share of the consortium which replaced its 
former monopoly in the wake of Mossadeq’s fall was just 40 per cent. For the first time, the 
major US oil companies were also given an interest in the exploitation of Iranian oil, 
receiving a matching share in the new consortium. In addition to whittling down the 
proportion of the consortium owned by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, American 
negotiators also looked askance at the Company’s compensation claims, US Secretary of 
Defense, Charles E. Wilson, criticizing the British for ‘trying to sell something for twice what 
it is worth and they don’t [even] have clear title’.51 
 In many ways, the crisis surrounding the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company encapsulates one of the principal reasons for Anglo-American discord in the 
Middle East, namely the clash between the British imperative to protect its national and 
imperial interests in the region on the one hand, and the American preoccupation with the 
Cold War and containment on the other. As the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, Sir William Strang, presciently noted: ‘The main difference between us and the 
Americans in this affair seems to be that to the Americans, in the fight against Communism 
in Persia, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is expendable. It is not possible for us to start from 
this premise.’52 The nationalization of Anglo-Iranian provided a foretaste of much graver 
Anglo-American differences following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company 
in 1956. 
Writing to Eden, President Eisenhower couched his opposition to the use of force very 
much in Cold War terms, warning: ‘the peoples of the Near East, and of North Africa and, to 
some extent, of all of Asia and all of Africa, would be consolidated against the West to a 
degree which, I fear, could not be overcome in a generation and, perhaps, not even in a 
century particularly having in mind the capacity of the Russians to make mischief’.53 In his 
memoirs, Eisenhower cast doubt on the viability of military occupation which would result 
from the use of force. ‘Unless the occupying power was ready to employ the brutalities of 
dictatorship,’ he mused, ‘local unrest would soon grow into guerrilla resistance, then open 
revolt, and possibly, wide-scale conflict. We of the West, who believe in freedom and human 
dignity, could not descend to use Communist methods.’54 
In the aftermath of the Anglo-French attack on Egypt at the beginning of November 
1956, it was Dulles who led the charge against his allies, warning the National Security 
Council that  
if we were not now prepared to assert our leadership in this cause, leadership would 
almost certainly be seized by the Soviet Union... For many years now the United 
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States has been walking a tightrope between the effort to maintain our old and valued 
relations with our British and French allies on the one hand, and on the other trying to 
assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly independent 
countries who have escaped from colonialism… Unless we now assert and maintain 
this leadership, all of these newly independent countries will turn from us to the 
USSR. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and French colonialist 
policies.55 
Dulles subsequently added that ‘what the British and French had done was nothing but the 
straight old-fashioned variety of colonialism of the most obvious sort’.56 To make matters 
worse, the Anglo-French action deflected attention away from the Soviet Union’s 
contemporaneous suppression of the Hungarian revolt which had threatened to disrupt the 
Warsaw Pact. In the words of Allen Dulles (brother of John Foster and Director of the CIA): 
‘How can anything be done about the Russians even if they suppress the revolt, when our 
own allies are guilty of exactly similar acts of aggression?’57 ‘It is nothing less than tragic’, 
agreed his brother, ‘that at this very time, when we are on the point of victory over Soviet 
colonialism in Eastern Europe, we should be forced to choose between following in the 
footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa, or splitting our course away from 
their course.’58 
Referring to Britain and France during a hastily convened conference at the White 
House with his keys advisers, Eisenhower himself bluntly stated that ‘he did not see much 
value in an unworthy and unreliable ally and that the necessity to support them might not be 
as great as they believed’.59 The President was as good as his word, ostracizing Eden, 
permitting US condemnation of Britain and France in the United Nations, and remaining 
unmoved in the face of Britain’s economic plight caused by the virtual cessation of Middle 
East oil exports to Britain and a ruinous run on the pound. Eden’s assumption that the 
Eisenhower administration would, in the last resort, back British actions was arguably his 
most serious miscalculation during the Suez episode. US Ambassador in London Winthrop 
Aldrich mused that ‘even at the last moment Eden thought that, faced with a fait accompli, 
we were going to recognize what he believed was Britain’s vital interest and would support 
him’.60 In a similar vein, the former Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, 
Sir Archibald Ross, recalled that Eden was ‘determined to believe that in the end the 
Americans would be with us in benevolent neutrality. What in fact we got was hostile 
neutrality.’61 At the time of Suez, Eden told the Cabinet that there was ‘Little risk tht. in last 
resort U.S. would not support us.’62 Such complacency infected the thinking of other key 
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British decision-makers, not least Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan who 
recalled that ‘I was confident that if and when the moment for action arrived we should have, 
if not the overt, at least the covert sympathy and support of the Government and people of the 
United States.’63 
The failure of Eden’s inner circle to test the supposition that America would 
ultimately back, or at least not oppose, the use of force was matched by the US 
administration’s failure to spell out the consequences of British military action.64 Equally, 
Eden’s delusion that the United States would ultimately acquiesce in the use of force was 
mirrored by Eisenhower’s that the British premier would not embark on a military campaign 
without consulting with the Americans first.65 Indeed, the Suez crisis underscores that the 
special relationship had a tendency to obfuscate, rather than facilitate clear transatlantic 
communication, leaving policy-makers reliant upon implicit understandings rather than 
explicit statements, upon assumption rather than analysis. This reached a remarkable pitch in 
September 1956 during Macmillan’s infamous meeting with Eisenhower. Despite Suez being 
discussed in only the most tangential of ways, the Chancellor reached the remarkable 
conclusion that ‘I don’t think there is going to be any trouble from Ike – he and I understand 
each other – he’s not going to make any real trouble if we have to do something drastic.’66 In 
fact Eisenhower was affronted by the apparent deception practised by his allies, famously 
exploding in the aftermath of the Anglo-French attack on Egypt: ‘nothing justifies double 
crossing us’.67 Indeed, US anger at Britain’s propensity to act unilaterally in the region 
without prior consultation with Washington had become a principal source of Anglo-
American tension. For instance, on the eve of Britain’s accession in April 1955 to the 
Baghdad Pact, a US-sponsored defence organization of Middle Eastern territories fringing the 
Soviet Union, Dulles had complained: ‘it looks as though the UK had grabbed the ball on the 
northern tier policy and was running away with it in a direction which would have ... 
unfortunate consequences’.68 
Undeterred by the negative US response, Eden had told the Cabinet on 4 October 
1955 that ‘Our interests in the Middle East are greater than those of the United States because 
of our dependence on Middle East oil, and our experience in the area was greater than theirs. 
We should not therefore allow ourselves to be restricted overmuch by reluctance to act 
without full American concurrence and support.’69 At the end of October, and against the 
background of this policy statement, British-led forces evicted the Saudis who had been 
occupying the Buraimi oasis, a territory in South-East Arabia which was also claimed by the 
British protected states of Oman and Abu Dhabi. More significantly, this action was taken 
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without first informing the Americans, let alone consulting with them. This piece of brazen 
unilateralism on the part of Britain caused consternation in Washington, Assistant Secretary 
of State Herbert Hoover berating the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, for the lack of 
consultation and insisting that Britain and America ‘play it together from now on’.70 Despite 
this plea, British defiance of Washington continued with the attempt towards the end of 1955 
to persuade Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact. British failure prompted Eisenhower to remark: 
‘We tried to make the British see the danger of ... pressuring Jordan into joining the Northern 
Tier Pact. They went blindly ahead and ... have been suffering one of the most severe 
diplomatic defeats Britain has taken in many years.’71 
Although Eden’s successors avoided a Suez-style breach with the Americans, they 
still showed a propensity to act in the Middle East without full backing from Washington. 
The decision of the new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, to send British troops to Jordan 
to stabilize the Kingdom following the July 1958 revolution in neighbouring Iraq was far 
from welcome in Washington and received, at best, grudging support. In Dulles’ opinion, the 
British allowed themselves to be ‘foolishly exposed in Jordan’, and in fact recalled that ‘we 
had not wanted the British to go in’.72 Macmillan also defied Eisenhower’s successor, John F. 
Kennedy, by refusing to accede to US pressure to recognize the new republican government 
in Yemen following the revolution there in September 1962 and providing covert support for 
the Yemeni royalists in the ensuing civil war, a conflict the Americans had sought to damp 
down for fear of its damaging regional effects. With typical understatement, Macmillan 
recalled that Kennedy was ‘somewhat ruffled by our intransigence’.73 More serious examples 
of the United States’ disenchantment with their British ally and its modus operandi occurred 
during Harold Wilson’s Labour government which came to office in October 1964. 
Despite its ostensible warmth, the relationship between Wilson and Lyndon Baines 
Johnson, who had become US President in November 1963 following Kennedy’s 
assassination, was far from smooth. Although Johnson’s description of Wilson as ‘a little 
creep camping on my doorstep’ was apocryphal,74 he is alleged to have said in response to 
one of Wilson’s frequent requests for a meeting: ‘We have got enough pollution around here 
already without Harold coming over ...’75 Personal animosities were heightened by policy 
differences, particularly over Vietnam. Johnson’s decision to escalate the war contrasted with 
Wilson’s studied refusal to commit troops and his forlorn efforts to broker peace which 
Johnson dismissed as a case of ‘Nobel Prize fever’.76 Nevertheless, Britain’s remaining 
imperial assets, which became known as the role East of Suez, were still valued by the 
Johnson White House and increasingly so, not least in the context of the Vietnam War. As 
10 
 
British Defence Secretary Denis Healey bluntly recalled: ‘The United States, after trying for 
thirty years to get Britain out of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, was now trying 
desperately to keep us in; during the Vietnam war it did not want to be the only country 
killing coloured people on their own soil.’77 In the course of discussions in January 1966, US 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk had explicitly told Healey that ‘It would be disastrous if the 
American people were to get the impression that the US is entirely alone; they simply will not 
accept it…. insistent questions are being asked by the American people as to what our allies 
are doing while we are in Vietnam’.78 Unsurprisingly, the American reaction to the unilateral 
British decision at the beginning of 1968 to withdraw from East of Suez by 1971, itself 
precipitated by Britain’s unilateral devaluation of sterling at the end of 1967, was greeted 
with dismay in Washington. 
On learning of British plans for total withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and Far East 
by 1971, Johnson gave full vent to his feelings: ‘I cannot conceal from you my deep dismay 
upon learning this profoundly discouraging news. If these steps are taken, they will be 
tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that means for future safety and 
health of the free world.’79 Foreign Secretary George Brown, who had travelled to 
Washington to explain British policy, sampled American wrath at first hand. Brown 
confessed to having a ‘disturbing and distasteful’ discussion with Rusk during which the 
latter expostulated: ‘For God’s sake act like Britain’.80 Underlining his disapproval of the 
Wilson government’s apparent prioritization of the welfare state over the presence East of 
Suez, Rusk stated he ‘could not believe that free aspirins and false teeth were more important 
than Britain’s world role’.81 Rusk went on to fulminate that Britain appeared to be ‘opting out 
of its world responsibilities’, that confidence had been ‘terribly shaken’, and, perhaps most 
damagingly, that ‘it was an end of an era’ by which he implied that ‘it was the end of the age 
of cooperation between the United States and ourselves’. Rusk was particularly incensed by 
what he perceived to be the lack of consultation which had preceded the British decision, 
using the phrase ‘the acrid aroma of fait accompli’ to underline his point.82 In this sense, the 
reasons for America’s anger and disenchantment over Britain’s decision to withdraw from 
East of Suez can be compared to those following other unilateral British acts such as the 
expulsion of the Saudis from Buraimi in 1955, and the Anglo-French ultimatum and 
subsequent attack on Egypt towards the end of 1956. Using language reminiscent of that 
employed by Eisenhower on hearing of the Anglo-French ultimatum, Minister at the British 
Embassy in Washington, Edward Tomkins, noted the feeling among many Americans that 
‘they had been “double-crossed” by the British Government in terms of assurances given to 
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them both in July and at the time of devaluation that the decisions then taken were not in 
conflict with basic foreign policy objectives’.83 In the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal 
announcement, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey also impressed upon the British 
Ambassador, Sir Patrick Dean, that ‘there really should be some prior consultation, at any 
rate between HMG and the US Government, before either of us simply walked out of places 
or abandoned our positions in them for our own unilateral reasons and without giving the 
other Government a chance to consider the implications and what, if anything, might be done 
to minimise the damage’.84 Unsurprisingly, the decision to withdraw from East of Suez 
resulted in not merely short-term irritation and dismay in Washington, but also a longer-term 
re-assessment of Anglo-American relations. 
Shortly after the withdrawal announcement, Thomas L. Hughes of the State 
Department’s Intelligence and Research Bureau postulated that ‘Conventional wisdom holds 
that partnership between a big power and a smaller one can last only so long as the former 
finds it beneficial. Accordingly, it is said, the special relationship can be advantageous to the 
US only as long as the UK can make a meaningful physical contribution.’85 At a meeting of 
the National Security Council in June 1968, the new Defense Secretary, Clark Clifford, 
bluntly stated: ‘the British do not have the resources, the backup, or the hardware to deal with 
any big world problem.... they are no longer a powerful ally of ours as they cannot afford the 
cost of an adequate defense effort’.86 The Foreign Office, moreover, lamented that the East of 
Suez decisions had engendered a feeling in many Americans that Britain was ‘the sick man of 
Europe who lost his nerve and chickened out of his responsibilities’.87 
If British unilateralism and lack of consultation had been one of the major causes of 
US consternation at the East of Suez decision, the British could be equally disturbed by 
similar such examples deriving from American decision-making. Shortly after President 
Truman recognized the state of Israel on 14 May 1948, the US Ambassador in London, Lewis 
Douglas, reported: ‘Irrespective of [the] rights and wrongs of [the] question, I believe [the] 
worst shock so far to general Anglo-American concept of policy since I have been here was 
[the] sudden US de facto recognition [of] Jewish State without previous notice of our 
intentions to [the] British Government.’88 Mention has already been made of British 
bafflement at Dulles’ public statement in September 1956 that the US did not intend to shoot 
its way through the Suez Canal. As Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd complained, it was ‘very 
difficult to build up any sort of pressure on the Egyptians when friend Foster has Press 
Conferences!’89 In somewhat more measured tones, Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook 
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informed Winston Churchill that ‘during the last week or so, the Western position has been 
seriously weakened by public statements made in the United States’.90 
 Despite Harold Macmillan’s assiduous efforts to re-build the special relationship, a 
‘Declaration of Common Purpose’ following talks with Eisenhower in October 1957 being 
subsequently hailed by Macmillan as a ‘Declaration of Interdependence’,91 the British still 
felt dissatisfied at the level of consultation over Middle Eastern matters. For instance, 
President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon’s request in July 1958 for outside assistance was met 
by unilateral American intervention. As the US representative at the United Nations, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, explained on the eve of US action: ‘If intervention in Lebanon by U.S. troops 
becomes unavoidable it would be very much better for U.S. troops to go in alone. The world 
sees us in an entirely different light than it sees the U.K. and France.’92 On discovering that 
the US had decided upon unilateral military intervention in Lebanon, despite his preference 
for a joint-Anglo-American response, Macmillan protested to Eisenhower: ‘You are doing a 
Suez on me.’93 
 Macmillan’s disillusionment with US policy was intensified by President Kennedy’s 
approval in August 1962 of the sale of US Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel. The 
American decision caused consternation among British statesmen who believed the Americans 
had made a firm decision earlier in the year not to supply missiles to any Middle Eastern 
country and had high hopes of selling their own rival Bloodhound system to the Israelis. 
Macmillan was particularly incensed by the lack of consultation and dashed off an intemperate 
message to Kennedy: 
To be informed on Saturday afternoon that your Government are going to make an 
offer to supply on Sunday is really not consultation. I cannot believe that you were 
privy to this disgraceful piece of trickery. For myself I must say frankly that I can 
hardly find words to express my sense of disgust and despair. Nor do I see how you and 
I are to conduct the great affairs of the world on this basis.94 
Macmillan proceeded to inform the President that he had ‘instructed our officials to let me 
have a list of all the understandings in different parts of the world which we have entered into 
together. It certainly makes it necessary to reconsider our whole position on this and allied 
matters.’95 That this response should come from a Prime Minister who had assiduously 
sought to repair the Suez breach, and had established an ostensibly close working relationship 
with President Kennedy, is particularly striking. Unsurprisingly, the much more distant 
relationship between Prime Minister Edward Heath and President Richard Nixon in the early 
1970s translated itself into even greater strain over Middle Eastern matters. 
13 
 
 In his memoirs, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger memorably likened 
Nixon’s relationship with Heath to ‘that of a jilted lover who has been told that friendship 
was still possible, but who remembers the rejection rather than being inspired by the 
prospect’.96 Accounting for Heath’s reserve, Kissinger mused ‘Whether it was the memory of 
the American pressure that had aborted the Suez adventure in 1956 when Heath was Chief 
Whip of the Conservative Party ... or whether the reason was dedication to a vision of Europe 
quite similar to de Gaulle’s, Heath dealt with us with an unsentimentality totally at variance 
with the “special relationship”’.97 Despite welcoming Heath’s unexpected general election 
victory in 1970, Nixon failed to establish a rapport with Heath, describing one unscheduled 
car journey they were forced to endure together as ‘tough going’.98 Personal incompatibility 
was compounded by policy differences. 
In his annual review for 1973, British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Cromer, 
described it as ‘a year that turned sour’.99 While this was undoubtedly the case with respect to 
the Nixon White House which became mired in the Watergate scandal, it could equally be 
applied to Anglo-American relations. The year began inauspiciously with Kissinger’s 
declaration of the ‘Year of Europe’ which encountered a chilly reception in most European 
capitals. His attempts to clarify his thinking with calls for a US/European declaration in June 
were greeted with a ‘pregnant silence’ from Europe.100 Later in the year, Heath had told 
journalists that it was ‘wrong to imagine that the Americans could have “The Year of 
Europe” without consultation and yet it had been launched without a single word. He did not 
believe they would ask for “A year of China” without consulting the Chinese but they had 
done that in the case of Europe.’101 Anglo-Americans differences cohered and intensified as a 
result of the renewal of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Six years earlier, Wilson and Johnson had been unable to co-ordinate a joint Anglo-
American response in the lead-up to the 1967 Six-Day War. The Johnson White House 
favoured the British taking the lead in establishing a naval force of maritime countries to 
permit the freedom of international passage through the Straits of Tiran into the Gulf of 
Aqaba which had been closed to Israeli shipping by Nasser on 22 May.102 Despite Foreign 
Secretary George Brown’s brief flirtation with this idea, the full Cabinet declared that ‘it 
would be inconsistent with our interests in the Middle East to incur the risks inherent in any 
commitment to the use of force to reopen the Straits. In addition to its effect on our relations 
with the Arab States and on our difficulties in South Arabia in particular, such action might 
have grave financial consequences.’103 Unsurprisingly, the Cabinet also emphasized that ‘we 
should seek to avoid the appearance of taking the lead’.104 As the crisis mounted, Hal 
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Saunders of the US National Security Council staff bemoaned that ‘we may face a situation 
where no one will come in with us on the regatta’, adding: ‘I gather the British and Canadians 
are wobbling’.105 Providing some background to the British position, the Deputy Director of 
Intelligence and Research at the US State Department, George C. Denning, recorded that 
growing British reluctance to use force stemmed from the UK’s tendency to give ‘priority to 
its economic and commercial, rather than its political, links to the area’.106 Similar 
considerations informed British policy at the time of the next Arab-Israeli confrontation in 
1973. 
On 6 October 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces caught their Israeli foes off-guard in a 
well co-ordinated attack which initially yielded considerable results. Although Secretary of 
State Kissinger from the outset called for transatlantic co-operation,107 the Yom Kippur War 
brought simmering Anglo-American tensions to the surface. Kissinger’s wish for a Security 
Council resolution calling for a cease-fire and a return to the cease-fire line was rebuffed by 
the British, Lord Cromer informing the Secretary of State that ‘we do not want a resolution 
which called for the Arabs to withdraw from territory which was their own’.108 Britain’s 
continuing recalcitrance, which stemmed from an unwillingness to alienate Arab oil 
producers upon which Britain’s energy requirements had come to depend, prompted 
Kissinger to report: ‘As far as the President was concerned, he could not recall any crisis in 
the last three years when the British had been with the Americans when the chips were 
down.’109 
If American ire had been raised by British reluctance to do America’s bidding in the 
United Nations, this was matched by British anger at US failure adequately to consult over 
the decision taken in the early hours of 25 October 1973 to place American bases on nuclear 
alert in response to General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev’s, 
threat to send Soviet forces to Egypt. Shortly after 1am Kissinger telephoned Lord Cromer to 
inform him of the Soviet threat and the US response. According to Kissinger ‘It was a classic 
example of the “Special Relationship” with Britain.... We shared our information as a matter 
of course, despite the fact that the Heath Government was doing its utmost to distance itself 
from us in Europe and had rather inconspicuously underlined its different perspective in the 
Middle East.’110 The British, however, viewed matters differently. On being awoken, Lord 
Cromer had bellowed: ‘Why tell us, Henry? Tell your friends the Russians.’111 The British 
Ambassador subsequently upbraided the US Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, for the 
lack of consultation with America’s NATO partners on the US military alert. While accepting 
that Britain had been kept well informed of the alert, Cromer was quick to point out that this 
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differed from being ‘closely consulted’.112 For his part, and in reference to the UK, Kissinger 
told journalists that ‘the countries that were most consulted proved amongst the most difficult 
in their cooperation’.113 
Reviewing the 1973 Middle East crisis, US Ambassador to Britain, Walter 
Annenberg, noted that it had produced strains in the Anglo-American relationship which had 
been ‘as evident as they had been deplorable’.114 The Ambassador went on to notify 
Washington that ‘the British have reacted with acute sensitivity to US criticism of their 
attitude and performance: they considered our rebukes unjustifiably harsh and lacking in 
recognition of the difficult position in which Britain found itself, especially with respect to 
Arab oil on which the country’s industrial life depends’. Recognising that the ‘special’ 
quality in the Anglo-American relationship had been ‘more apparent than real for some time’, 
Annenberg remarked that the October War had ‘dramatically revealed the dimension of the 
change and surfaced divergences which had largely remained outside public scrutiny’.115 
Henry Kissinger at the end of 1973 went so far as to declare that the special relationship was 
‘collapsing’.116 Shunning sentimentality, nonetheless, Lord Cromer observed that ‘the Anglo-
American “special relationship”, and its successor the “natural relationship”, had always been 
based to a marked degree on myth’.117 Part of the myth was surely that the two countries’ 
shared interests would produce shared policies. In the Middle East, however, interests, and 
hence policies, often diverged. The concept of the special relationship itself hindered the 
smooth-running of Anglo-American relations in the region by obscuring differences, 
stymieing clear communication, and practising self-deception on policy-makers on both sides 
of the Atlantic who assumed a unanimity which all too often failed to exist. As Thomas 
Hughes of the State Department perceptively noted in 1968: ‘critics of the special 
relationship on both sides complain that because it promises more than it can deliver, it leads 
each partner to be displeased upon finding the other less accommodating than could be 
wished’.118 Indeed, the failure of the special relationship, not least in the Middle East, to live 
up to expectations actually served to damage relations between Britain and America in the 
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